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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred on the Utah Court of 
Appeals by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This interlocutory appeal is from an order granting 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, entered by the Honorable 
Joseph I. Dimick, Fourth Circuit Court Judge of the Provo Circuit, 
State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether properly gathered police evidence can be suppressed 
where the defendant claims police interference precluded her from 
securing an independent chemical test as permitted by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6)? 
II. Whether properly gathered evidence can be suppressed in 
contravention of the clear and plain reading of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-44.10(6), which clearly states that failure of the accused to 
secure an independent test, cannot affect the admissibility of 
police evidence? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A reproduction of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 in its entirety 
is set forth in the addendum, pursuant to the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals 24(a)(6) and 24(f). 
In relevant part, the code states: 
(a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have 
a physician of his choice administer a chemical test in 
addition to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of the peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional 
test does not affect admissibility of the results of the 
test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, 
or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test 
or tests administered at the direction of a peace 
officer. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 14, 1989, the Defendant Mary Werner was arrested 
by Provo City police officers for driving under the influence. (R. 
at 25) . She was asked to submit to a breath test, which she 
refused, requesting a urine sample instead. She was then informed, 
under Utah's Implied Consent Law, that: one, she might lose her 
driver's license if she did not submit to the test; and two, she 
had the right to obtain an independent test administered by a 
physician of her choice. (R. at 30). Consequently, Ms. Werner 
relented and submitted to the Intoxilyzer test. (Id.) The 
Defendant then renewed her demand for a urine sample. (Id.) The 
Defendant was given a urine sample bottle, and a private restroom 
was made available for her use.(Id.) The Defendant then took the 
bottle, and of her own volition secured a sample for analysis. (R. 
at 2 6). Upon release, the Defendant took the sample to the Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center for testing. The Hospital refused 
to test the urine sample claiming that the chain of custody was 
disputable. (R. at 26) . Consequently, at trial, the Defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence of the Intoxilyzer breath test. The 
trial court found that the Defendant was made aware of her right 
bo a physician administered test, and that the police did not act 
in bad faith to frustrate her right to an independent test. 
(Ruling, Appendix). However, he held that the police's response 
bo the Defendant's request for an individual test did not provide 
bhe Defendant with a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right, 
vhich the trial court claimed amounted to a denial of due process. 
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(Ruling, Appendix). Consequently, the court granted the motion 
to suppress. The City appeals from that decision of the trial 
court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6) is clear. 
Failure by the defendant to secure an independent test cannot 
affect the admissibility of properly secured police evidence. 
It would be against legislative intent and public policy to allow 
the trial court's suppression order to stand. Driving under the 
influence is an evil which the Utah Legislature has sought to curb 
through the enactment of strict legislation, and the trial court's 
ruling should not be allowed to circumvent the clear and plain 
meaning of the statute. 
Furthermore, the Appellee was afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to secure an independent test. The burden of gathering 
exculpatory evidence rests on the Appellee, not the City. The 
Appellee was properly informed of her right to an independent test, 
and it was her duty to make sure that proper testing procedures 
were followed. There was no unreasonable interference by the 
officers, and their actions did not frustrate her right to secure 
an independent test. 
Likewise, it is highly unlikely that the Appellee's evidence 
would have been exculpatory. Her blood alcohol levels were well 
above the limits allowed by law, and she failed to successfully 
complete the field sobriety tests administered by the officer. 
There was no evidence of bad faith, which would have resulted in 
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a loss of due process, on the part of the police, since it is 
apparent that their evidence would stand for itself. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COURT SUPPRESSION OP MARY WERNER'S POLICE ADMINISTERED 
INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT WAS AN ABUSE OP DISCRETION, IN DIRECT 
CONTRAVENTION OP BOTH STATUTE AND LAW. 
The trial court's ruling suppressing police evidence, 
collected according to correct evidentiary procedures, places an 
inordinate burden on the police in dealing with intoxicated 
drivers. If the trial courtfs ruling is affirmed, the police could 
be required to provide substantially more help to defendants than 
is either prudent or necessary. In effect, the police, under this 
erroneous ruling, may be required to gather and preserve evidence 
for the accused. This would limit police efficiency in dealing 
with the myriad of problems which they confront daily, plus such 
a ruling flies in the face of legislative intent in passing laws 
to combat the scourge of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The suppression of properly secured police evidence, gathered in 
good faith and without a showing of bad faith motives on the part 
of the police, sends an improper message to those whose alcohol 
related- activities threaten public safety. 
A. Utah Code Section 41-6-44.10(6) Clearly Demonstrates The 
Legislature's Intent That Police Evidence Not Be 
Suppressed Upon Defendant's Failure to Secure An 
Independent Test. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 
2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (1966), in addressing the issue of 
legislative intent, declared that in "determining that intent the 
statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was 
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designed to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if 
that can be done consistent with its language." Furthermore, in 
Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 
398 (Utah 1980), the Court stated that " [notwithstanding the 
foregoing, there is also to be considered the over-arching 
principle, applicable to all statues, that they should be construed 
and applied in accordance with the intent of the legislature and 
the purpose sought to be accomplished." The Supreme Court of 
Kansas echoed this sentiment declaring that "[o]ur construction 
should be based on legislative intent to be determined from the 
whole act and construction should be in accord with the general 
intent and purpose of the entire statute." In re Birdsong, 216 Kan. 
297, 532 P.2d 1301, 1307 (1975). Likewise, the Supreme Court of 
Utahfs sister state, Idaho, stated that 
[i]n construing a statute not only must the literal 
wording of the statute be examined, but also account must 
be taken of other matters, such as the context, the 
object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of 
the times and the legislation upon the same subject, 
public policy, contemporaneous construction and the like. 
Knight v. Employment Security Agency, 398 P.2d 643, 645 (1965). 
Indubitably, drunk driving is a menace on our streets and 
highways. Therefore, state legislatures have enacted tough laws 
to deal with such a serious offense as driving under the influence 
of alcohol. Utah is no exception. Utah's Implied Consent Law 
states that a 
person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test 
or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose 
of determining whether he was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood 
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or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(1) (a) (1953) As part of this statutory 
scheme, it is also recognized that the "person to be tested may, 
at his own expense, have a physician of his own choice administer 
a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at 
the direction of a peace officer." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44.10(6) (a) (1953) This statute further provides, that the 
"failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the 
direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or 
tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6)(b) (1953) The literal wording of this statute 
boldly and plainly delineates a defendant's rights when arrested 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. A person charged under 
this law has the right to have a "physician of his own choice" 
administer a second test. However, the unambiguous wording of the 
statute does not allow for suppression of police evidence because 
of a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant in securing or 
properly maintaining her own sample. Under the Parson test, the 
"intent of the Legislature and the purpose sought to be 
accomplished" by this legislation was to provide defendants with 
statutory rights to secondary tests, but not the privilege of 
suppressing legitimate, police administered Intoxilyzer tests. 
According to the Knight test, the literal wording of the 
statute, its context, objective, evils to be remedied, 
contemporaneous history, and public policy should be the measure 
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against which a statute is to be gauged. The literal wording of 
the statute does not allow for the court to suppress police 
evidence on account of Ms. Werner's failure or inability to obtain 
an independent test. Furthermore, driving under the influence is 
a societal ill which the Utah Legislature sought to control by 
passing the Implied Consent Law. In addressing the serious nature 
of this offense, the Legislature did not intend for the suppression 
of police evidence, when a defendant carelessly fails to preserve 
her own evidence. The wording of Section 41-6-44.10(6)(b) plainly 
states that the "failure or inability" of a defendant to obtain her 
own test "does not affect admissibility" of the police 
administered test. By granting Ms. Wernerfs motion to suppress, 
the trial court ignored the plain meaning of the statute, and ruled 
in direct contravention of the Legislature's intent. This ruling 
substantially weakens the law by allowing those, who would put the 
public in danger through their irresponsible acts, to prevail over 
legitimate police procedures carried out with the blessing of the 
law as constituted by the representatives of the people. Public 
policy is ill served through rulings of this sort. 
B. Ms. Werner Was Afforded A Reasonable Opportunity to 
Secure An Independent Test And Evaluation Of The Same. 
Ms. Werner claimed that the police by providing her with a 
vial interfered with her right to an independent test. This claim 
fails for two reasons. First, the testimony of Officer West 
reveals that Ms. Werner was told that she could obtain her own 
sample, and "have it analyzed" wherever she chose. (R. at 30) . 
Second, the admonition on the DUI report form was read to Ms. 
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Werner, thus placing the obligation of securing an independent test 
on Ms. Werner, not the police. Id. The admonition states 
[i]f you refuse the test, it will not be given, however 
I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one 
year with no provision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to 
have a physician of your own choice administer a test at 
your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested 
you to submit to, so long as it does not delay the test 
or tests requested by me. 
(Appendix). This admonition is a succinct version of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6). Accordingly, the onus of securing another 
test rests with Ms. Werner and not with the police. Neither the 
admonition nor the statute places the burden of gathering evidence 
for the accused on the police. It is well recognized that the 
"police must not hinder an individual's timely, reasonable attempts 
to obtain an independent examination, but they need not assist 
him." Schroeder v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 772 P.2d 1278, 1281 
(Nev. 1989). see also. State v. Hudes, 128 N.J.Super. 589, 321 A.2d 
275 (1974). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in examining the right of a defendant 
to an independent blood test after being arrested for driving under 
the influence, declared that 
the law does not impose upon law enforcement agencies the 
requirement that they take the initiative, or even any 
affirmative action, in procuring the evidence deemed 
necessary to the defense of an accused. Rather it is the 
accused who must act to protect his interests, and it is 
only when he is denied an opportunity, reasonable under 
the circumstances, to procure a timely sample of his 
blood that he can properly claim a denial of due process. 
State v. Revna, 92 Idaho 669, 448 P.2d 762, 767 (1968) (quoting In 
re Koehne, 54 Cal.2d 757, 8 Cal.Rptr. 435, 356 P.2d 179 (I960)). 
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Furthermore, the Court declared that the "State may not suppress 
evidence, but it need not gather evidence for the accused.11 Id. 
The burden rests squarely on the defendent to gather that evidence 
which is essential to her case. 
Ms. Werner claims that by giving her a vial the police denied 
her a reasonable opportunity to preserve possibly exculpatory 
evidence. (R. at 53) . However, as Officer West testified, Ms. 
Werner was not coerced or instructed as to any alternative test she 
was to perform. (R. at 30-31) . She was free to use the phones, call 
a physician, lawyer or any other person she chose to assist her 
with the testing. (Id.) This was not a police duty. The police 
had their evidence, which they felt was sufficient for their 
purposes. Their duty became one of preserving that evidence, not 
gathering exculpatory evidence for the accused. That 
responsibility continues with the defendant at all times. As it 
was stated in Commonwealth v. Alano, 388 Mass. 871, 448 N.E.2d 1122 
(Mass. 1983) , "it is the accused who must act to protect his 
interest, and it is only when he is denied an opportunity 
reasonable under the circumstances, to procure a timely sample of 
his blood that he can properly claim a denial of due process." see 
also. In re Newbern, 175 Cal.App.2d 862, 1 Cal.Rptr. 80 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1959). The burden of gathering exculpatory evidence, 
never shifted to the police, it continued with the accused—Ms. 
Werner. 
1. There was no unreasonable interference from the 
police abridging the Appellee's right to a second 
test. 
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There is no doubt that egregious police interference with the 
right of the accused to secure exculpatory evidence warrants the 
suppression of evidence gathered for the prosecution. Where the 
level of police interference has risen to the plane of overt 
interference with an accused's right to gather evidence, the courts 
have been strict in suppressing police evidence. In State v. 
Swanson, 722 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1986), the Montana Supreme Court 
ruled that the negligence of the police in allowing the defendant's 
blood sample to remain unrefrigerated, thus destroying its possible 
exculpatory value, constituted unreasonable interference with the 
accused's ability to gather evidence. The Court held that since 
the police had taken the sample from Swanson, they had a duty for 
its safekeeping. They failed in that duty, hence warranting 
dismissal of the case. Id. See also. City of Blaine v. Suess, 612 
P.2d 789 (Wash. 1980) (Dismissed because of failure of police to 
explain to foreigner his rights to second test); McNutt v. Superior 
Court of State of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 7, 648 P.2d 122, (1982) 
(Police held accused incommunicado, frustrating independent test); 
In re Martin, 24 Cal.Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 801 (1962)(Police denial 
of authorization to hospital to conduct independent test); State 
V. Hilditch, 36 Or.App. 497, 584 P.2d 376 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) ( 
Accused returned to jail, after hospital refused test until Accused 
could pay; Officer knew Accused's wife was en route with money when 
officer returned him to jail); Oshrin v. Coulter, 142 Ariz. 109, 
688 P. 2d 1001 (1984)(Defendant destroyed blood sample after being 
released from jail and having charges dismissed); Ward v. State, 
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758 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1988)( Officer refused to permit Defendant to 
choose alternative site for testing, because the State did not have 
a contract with Defendant's choice of hospitals). 
Although from diverse jurisdictions, the above cases reveal 
one consistency: in order for the courts to dismiss a case or 
suppress evidence, the level of police interference has to be more 
than casual; it must rise to a plane of substantial interference 
with a defendant's right to an independent test. The courts have 
been willing to permit innocent mistakes without suppressing 
evidence or dismissing cases. The Arizona Court of Appeals found 
no unreasonable interference where the defendant in a DWI case was 
informed that his pretrial hearing had been "scratched", whereupon 
the defendant destroyed his breath sample after waiting a month. 
The Court held that this was not unreasonable interference since 
the "second breath sample in this case was destroyed by appellee, 
not the police, and not as a result of any affirmative conduct on 
the part of the police or judicial system." State v. Crotty, 152 
Ariz. 264, 731 P.2d 629 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
In Montana, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's 
repeated requests for an independent test during the reading of the 
Implied Consent Law Advisory Form, which were denied, but later 
complied with, was not unreasonable interference by the police. 
State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853 (Mont. 1988). In Clark, the officer 
made five phone calls for the defendant, but the defendant did not 
once make a request for a blood test during any of these calls. 
The Court found that the "criminal accused has a constitutional 
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right to attempt to obtain exculpatory evidence." Id. at 855. At 
the same time, however, the Court held that "[o]ur decisions do not 
mandate police officers to affirmatively act to obtain exculpatory 
evidence, but instead, to avoid interference with efforts on the 
part of the accused to obtain a sampling of his blood." Id. The 
Court then went to hold that "[n]o unreasonable impediments exist 
in the present case." Id. at 856. 
In State v. Goodwin. 160 Ariz. 366, 773 P.2d 471, 472 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1989) , the Defendant was given a second sample of his 
breath, and the officer told him that "if you want to throw it 
away, throw it away yourself." The defendant stood up and 
deposited the sample in a trash can. Id. In ruling that the trial 
court erred in suppressing the state's evidence, the Arizona Court 
of Appeals found that the defendant had acted unilaterally in 
destroying the second breath sample, without unreasonable 
interference from the police officer. Id. at 474. The Court also 
found that the officer had not acted improperly, although in 
handing the defendant the sample, he did more than was required of 
him by law. Id. 
In another Arizona case, the Arizona Court of Appeals in State 
v. Ramos, 155 Ariz. 153, 745 P.2d 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), found 
that it was error to dismiss the State's DWI case against Ramos. 
Ramos asked for the dismissal, since he was unable to secure an 
independent blood alcohol test, because of the arresting officer's 
failure to inform him of his right to an independent chemical test. 
Id. at 601. The Court held that "[f]ailure of the officer to 
13 
inform the DWI suspect of his right to an independent test does not 
constitute interference with the ability to get an independent 
test. Ramos was free to arrange for an independent test." 
Id. at 604. The Court further explained that the defendant "was 
afforded a fair chance to obtain independent evidence of sobriety 
essential to his defense at the only time when it was available." 
Id. at 604. Consequently, there was no interference on the part 
of the State as affecting Ramos1 right to an independent chemical 
test. 
In the case at hand, it is not disputed that the police gave 
Ms. Werner a vial, and told her she could obtain her own sample. 
(R. at 30). Although the officers took this step, their actions 
were not of the type censored by the courts in City of Blaine, 
McNutt, In re Martin, Hilditch, Oshrin, and Ward. Their actions 
were more in line with those permitted by the courts in Crotty, 
Clark, Goodwin, and Ramos. Ms. Werner was read the admonition from 
the DUI Report Form and was aware that the onus was on her to 
secure the independent test. (R. at 30) . The fact that the 
officers gave her a vial did not prevent her from questioning her 
attorney, a doctor, or any other qualified person about the correct 
manner in which to proceed with the test. There is nothing in the 
record which would indicate that she made such an effort. In fact, 
strict compliance with the admonition or the statute on which it 
is based, would have required Ms. Werner to secure the independent 
test through a physician of her choosing. If Ms. Werner had 
followed the statutorily approved route, her independent sample 
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would not have suffered from the infirmities which she claims. 
Furthermore, it was not police conduct, but that of a third 
party interloper, the hospital, which caused the interference 
claimed by the Appellee. The refusal of the hospital to test the 
independent sample was no fault of the police. Therefore, the 
hospital's refusal to test her sample cannot inure to the detriment 
of the police, and the intoxilyzer test requested by the police 
cannot be suppressed. Ms. Werner was free to consult with any of 
the several hospitals in the immediate area in order to have her 
urine sample tested. The record does not reveal, nor is any 
explanation given as to the failure of the Appellee to seek out an 
alternative testing center. Consequently, the Appellee's 
unilateral actions and the actions of others, of which the police 
had no control over, cannot be considered unreasonable interference 
by the police to an independent test. 
C. The Intoxilyzer Test And Other Facts Tend to 
Inculpate The Appellee, Casting Doubt On The 
Exculpatory Nature Of An Independent Test. 
The United States Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984), citing United States v. Acrurs, 427 U.S. 
97, 109-110 (1976), declared that for evidence to meet the 
standard of constitutional materiality, it "must possess an 
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be 
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means." 
The Court in Trombetta was asked to determine whether the 
Intoxilyzer was a viable means of testing breath samples, since the 
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Intoxilyzer does not preserve a sample for later testing. The 
Court held that although evidence gathered through use of an 
Intoxilyzer satisfies the constitutional materiality test, 
preservation of breath samples from an Intoxilyzer would be 
inculpatory rather than exculpatory in all but a tiny fraction of 
cases. Id. at 489. The Court also stated that although the 
Constitution imposes a duty on States to preserve evidence, such 
duty is limited to evidence which could play a significant role in 
a suspectfs defense. Id. Consequently, since the evidence gathered 
and destroyed by the Intoxilyzer is considered to be inculpatory, 
and not exculpatory, states are under to no duty to preserve 
secondary samples for a defendant's use. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1987), adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning verbatim 
concerning the use of the Intoxilyzer. Consequently, in the State 
of Utah, law enforcement agencies are not required to preserve 
breath samples for those they arrest for DUI under the Trombetta 
analysis. 
The Colorado Supreme Court addressed this issue in People v. 
Humes, 762 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1988), where the problem of suppressed 
evidence concerned the State's procedure of obtaining blood 
samples, for the State's exclusive use. The State had collected 
two samples from Humes, both of which were destroyed during 
testing. Consequently, Humes was left without an independent test 
with which to challenge the State's evidence. The trial court 
allowed the suppression of the State's evidence and the District 
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Court confirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, and, relying 
on Trombetta, expressed its doubt as to the exculpatory value of 
the destroyed evidence. The court explained that "the blood sample 
here fails to meet the *exculpatory value' requirement." Id. at 
668. Concerning an independent test, the Court stated that 
"[bjecause we are not persuaded that this evidence had exculpatory 
value apparent before its loss, we need not consider whether the 
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 
reasonably available means." Id. 
The Appellee was tested by an Intoxilyzer, which revealed her 
blood alcohol content to be .13, well over the limit allowed by 
law. (DUI Form, Appendix). Furthermore, the Appellee had a strong 
odor of alcohol about her. Id. Also, her speech was "slurred, loud 
& continual—very foul and abusive." Id. The Appellee was given 
routine field sobriety tests which she failed to complete 
satisfactorily. Id. This evidence, plus the attested reliability 
of the Intoxilyzer by the United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court, demonstrate that an independent test more than 
likely would have confirmed the Appellee's level of intoxication 
demonstrated by her Intoxilyzer test. Consequently, it is 
completely incongruous that the trial court could suppress evidence 
which was clearly inculpatory, simply because of the defendant's 
failure to secure an independent test. If the highest Court of the 
land can attest to the reliability of the Intoxilyzer to the 
degree, that they do not require that a sample to be preserved for 
defense use, then it is highly unlikely that the Appellee could 
17 
have produced exculpatory evidence had she been able to test her 
urine sample. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court explained in 
Arizona v. Youngblood, "the exculpatory value of the evidence must 
be apparent ^before the evidence was destroyed. '" U.S. , 109 
S.Ct. 333, 336 (1988). It is apparent that the exculpatory value 
of the Appelleefs evidence was nil, before it was destroyed. 
Likewise, there was no denial of due process simply because 
the Appellee lost her opportunity to an independent test. In 
Trombetta, it was held that "the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that law enforcement agencies 
preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis tests 
at trial." 467 U.S. at 491. In other words there is no violation 
of due process, where in using the Intoxilyzer, the evidence is 
destroyed through no fault of the police. Furthermore, no denial 
of due process exists in this case where the Appellee, through her 
own lack of due care, was unable to secure an independent test. 
The police had no control over Ms. Werner's choice of tests. She 
made her choice, that choice was out of the police's control, there 
was no denial of due process under these circumstances. 
Furthermore, the trial court found no evidence of bad faith and, 
as the United States Supreme Court held, in Youngblood, U.S. 
, 109 S.Ct. at 337 (1988), that " unless a criminal defendant 
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due 
process of law." There was no finding of bad faith as the trial 
court itself attested (Ruling, Appendix). Therefore, there was no 
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denial of due process. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals in Gundersen v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 762 P. 2d 104 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) addressing the issue 
of whether an incomplete implied consent form constituted grounds 
for suppression of police evidence, declared that "[i]n the absence 
of some evidence to the contrary, an independent test would as 
likely corroborate as invalidate the municipality's test." 
Furthermore, the Court declared that 
[t]his is not a case in which there is some evidence of 
a bad faith attempt by the municipality to discourage 
Gundersen from obtaining an independent test. Such 
evidence, if present, might support an inference that the 
officers lacked confidence in the integrity of their own 
test, justifying a spoliation instruction. 
Id. at 114. The Court then went on to state that " [t]here is 
nothing in this record to suggest that the municipality 
intentionally or negligently failed to produce the strongest 
evidence available to it, or that an independent test, if obtained, 
would have been exculpatory." Id. 
So it is with the case at hand. There was no attempt to 
discourage or interfere with Ms. Werner's right to an independent 
test. The police were confident that their evidence by way of the 
Intoxilyzer and other tests would stand for itself. They did not 
act in bad faith. There is nothing to suggest that had the 
Appellee secured an independent test, that it would have proved 
anything different than what was shown by the Intoxilyzer. 
The City does not challenge the Appellee's right to dispute the 
validity of testing procedures, the officer's training, or to raise 
doubts as to whether the test was properly administered. It is, 
19 
however, the grossest of inconsistencies for the trial court to 
suppress properly gathered evidence, in contravention of State 
statutes, simply because of the Appellee's failure to secure an 
independent test. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully 
requests that the Suppression Order of the Fourth Circuit Court be 
reversed. 
Dated this 11th day of July 1990. 
tj , ~ /I -
Vernon F. (Rick) Romney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief were served by mailing, U.S. Mails, 
postage prepaid, on this - day of July 1990 to the following 
individuals: 
Michael Petro, Attorney for Appellee 
101 East 2 00 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
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APPENDIX 
R U L I N G 
In this matter this Court is being asked by the Defendant to 
suppress the result of a breath test administered by the police to the 
defendant pursuant to the arrest of the defendant on driving under the 
influence charges. 
Based on the evidence presented by the parties at an evidentary hearing 
on the motion, the Court makes the following findings of fact. 
1. On the fourteenth day of November, 1989 the defendant was 
arrested by the Provo police-and brought to the police department 
where she was requested to submit to a breath test. 
2. At first the defendant declined, saying she had no confidence 
in the breath testing process and asked for a urine test. 
3. The police read to the defendant the provisions of the "implied 
consent law11 including her right to an independant test whereupon she 
consented to the breath test, and gave it, all the while advising that she 
also intended to have an independant test. 
4. After the breath test was completed the defendant inquired again 
about the independant test. 
5. The police officer who had custody of the defendant responded by 
handing the defendant a vile and saying to her that he thought she could 
keep a urine sample in the vile and have it tested later. 
6. The defendant took the vile into a restroom, unattended, placed 
a sample of her urine in it and stopped the vile with other materials 
provided by the police. 
7. The vile was not sealed, or marked in any fashion. 
8. The defendant, when released, took the vile to a local hospital 
and requested that they analize it. 
9. The hospital eventually decline to do so, noting in a letter to 
the defendant that the vile had not been sealed, marked and lacked the 
necessary chaine of evidence. 
The defendant does not claim that she did not receive notice of her 
right to an independant test nor is there anything in the evidence from 
which this Court could conclude that the police acted in bad faith or 
intentionally to frustrate an independant test. 
The City, in response to the motion primarily relies on the provision 
of section 41-6-44.10(6)(a) and (b) which provides for the independant 
test and there in paragraph (b) reads: ff(b) The failure or inability to 
obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the results 
of the test taken at the direction of a peace officer..." 
This Court however rejects the notion that the above cited provisions 
address themselves to wider circumstances than "...the failure or inability 
(of the defendant) to obtain the additional test...", and is silent with 
respect to what the remedy may be when the failure results, at least in 
part, from police conduct. 
It seems clear that if the failure to obtain an independant test 
does stem from police actions that such failure may well amount to a 
denial of due process and the appropriate sanition or remedy may well 
be the suppression of the result of the governments test notwithstanding 
the statute. 
Therefore the issue becomes one of deciding if the police response to 
the defendant's request for an independant test provided a reasonable 
opportunity to effectively exercise that right. 
Host of the cases dealing with these questions have turned on extremely 
different facts, such as whether the police frustrated the test, or gave 
notice of a right to it, or had some duty to provide affirmative assistance in 
obtaining the test. 
Not so here. In this case the police clearly gave notice of the right, 
followed by a suggestion as to how the defendant might proceed and there 
provided the materials to undertake the effort. 
So the question presented here is more one of if the police do 
undertake to give assistance to procure a test; must it have some reasonable 
chance of success. 
Clearly, the urine sample taken by the defendant could never have 
been admitted into evidence under the rules of evidence. There could never 
have been an adequate foundation laid. 
It is also clear that the police response amounted to giving advice which 
the defendant followed. 
After considering all of the above this Court finds that the police did 
not provide a reasonable opportunity to the defendant to effectively exercise 
her right to an independant test and that such conduct did act to deny the 
INTOXILYZER 
OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST - D (ASA) 
SUBJECT m ^ > w U f P A ^ DATE l>- 'V v' l TiME Ql°'\ 
INSTRUMENT if ^ - o o n a o LOCATION P r o o d f O 
O P E R A T O t e 1 1 1 ^ <A m *• 
POWER SWITCH ON, READY LIGHT ON. 
CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO PUMP TUBE, INSERT TEST RECORD 
CARD. 
PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 2. 
PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 3. 
DISCONNECT PUMP TUBE FROM BREATH TUBE, EXTEND BREATH 
TUBE AND INSERT MOUTHPIECE. - TAKE BREATH SAMPLE. 
(NOTE TIME) LIGHT 1 WILL COME ON AFTER SAMPLE IS 
TAKEN. 
REMOVE MOUTHPIECE, HOUSE BREATH TUBE AND CONNECT TO 
PUMP TUBE, PRESS ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 5. REMOVE TEST 
RECORD CARD. 
POWER SWITCH OFF. 
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\\X 2. 
\J 3. 
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\A 6. 
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G
2 T L S ^ S R I INSTRUMENT PRINT CODE 
0 0 
A — AIR BLANK 
B — BREATH 
C — CALIBRATOR (Simulator) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED 
CHECK LIST 
OPERATORS INITIAL 
INSTRUMENT LOCATION 
° I V Q O ( ( 3 Q 
INSTRUMENT SERIAL NUMBER 
DATE 
SUBJECT'S NAME 
O I M 3 
TIME FIRST OBSERVED 
O^o^ 
TIME TEST STARTED 
• ^ W 
" P P E R A W 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND / OR REMARKS 
t»\c 6 iv A . s t , 0>^\ 
, 1 3 ^ 
D 19400 
DUI REPORT FORM 
I. CASE IDENTIFICATION: .
 v 
Date /A/¥-fl5 nay 7v>/£l. Accident //<?• Case # &?o9*f! Time P r e p a r e d _ ^ ^ 
Subject's Name A^t/v C- aW/i/&r Address /oft / l k u ^ n / * [ / - , , 4Z- 2>&&fo 
Place of Employment / MAS* tletftnl Address , m  Home Telephone Number /£*<— Work Telephone Number >v< 
D.O.B. g -g -V7 Driver License # Jg.e7V.Sgtt Time of Arrest 0 M > S S  9  3.Q * .SBtt r 
Place of Arrest 4ssA. iaL. fh» tf. Charges h (TT . . 
Arresting Officer -JS^J *it»$i^r Assisting Officers 6-»j^6A * AjttA A/tif&d 
Arresting Agency A**0 PA-
II. VEHICLE 
Year & P° , o r /r—* 
License # and state 445 Art? 
Registered Owner 
\ .**" ^ Mate ^ l - , V*6*, *Ml- Cash U, 
AM Iff <T-ft Disposition fatf {y fik^ <&/!&*, 
A J & M Address 1 L 
III. WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name i Address Tele. # Age/DOB 
1. 4/WL I 
2. 
a 
5. 
IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
bblt/IZJ Off The facts establishing the subject's^actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: 3- Mary ,, 
A^ dAatr. iMu~~ Hu ear iLfttd A ft* MrtJ- , M < * r M< 'Sk 
V. DRIVING PATTERN: . * / _ y A / > y /> +~ 
Subject's location when first observed 00(fc <fi— L£*JS^. J T - fro*- aJawf r^tA- Ct^-JeX- . 
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: $o**— 
VI. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: . 
A . .\**i Jfa Lee! 4 e — - Jnk/ty Ale***/; f ^ / f o _ / A ^ k - f t 
VII. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Odor of alcoholic beverage jfo**x /J y ' / 
Speech' Sf^rr^J . LouJ f ^Tj^hju^. l/e*y tit*/ ? a4*f/V<L 
Balance roar. Xjaj^cstol , u)<A£L f UKA&LU, n 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness -fcfy/ H^oaf/ jtrtfef f ^J^Jo/ //uk£>V< 
Other physical characteristics. 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS: (Describe subject's actions) 
* nor*** M*ut0»± . » : _, j A 
$. /J~JSL<- fttltrM (iff***- JAJb -fL^ ffr'f \*~ttm*f j/^Aj /0 AUM.Ur£. 
5. 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? ^ Subject's ability to follow instructions" 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle 
Was subject's vehicle searched? ^ , Where? nr f/T C*< w / / 
When? Moo Evidence fsetiL- a / AlCA/fll Xtt*\ 
Person who performed the search 
B. Subject: ^ A f , / 
Was subject's person searched? MS Where? / / w v * * / 
When? &l&> Evidence Found . Affile* 
Person who performed the search U HUM 
CHEMICAL TESTS^ 
Mr. dr Mrs! n^f ^- tO/tfA/c^ , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving-tinder the influence of alcohoL(drugs)? Response, (if any) AJo faffou^ 
" >• £ ^ 4£L Mtfr/ff 7b fitr/* 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. I 
request that you take a L^JJ^ test. 
(blood-breath-urine) 
fi£j The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
WJiat is your response to my request- thai you submit to a chemicaj test? Response: -^ £LM- Ct 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? _ Type of test orzaxk* 
Test AdministerediDy Cff- /u /StSSad Where? A * o <ptul 
Time: /)>0J 'Results * /I37» Was subject notified of results? fcj 
Serial No. of test machine: 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
m The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
a tPQt a t VOUr O w n mnGn^G in a r i H i t i n n t n t h o n n ^ I hav/a r o m i D c t o H \/ru i tn e n h m i t tr\ er» I n n n oo !• H«*ae 
(if the subject claims the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, read the following:) 
• The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I wiff consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
Was subject advised of/the following rights? &1 When o^f? in* 
By Whom? ~SJ- M~£ D*A \ 1 Where? fa** 6* 
You have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can and will be used against you in acourt of law. 
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
"any questioning, if you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked?. 
INTERVIEW: 
1. Do you understand each of these rights I have, explained to you?. 
Response :Zf bbX Mtk<~ /zT/lo Irsc , 
2. Having theserjghts in mind, do you wish to talk to us now? . /IL A. 
Response *L-'m.~ 4cll/Y- _ ^ 2T /AtJ 7C fa/f A Mfa. /Zfte>. 
Were you operating a v a h t r y / d * . - , 
Where were you going? flrffi '(fat Jda& J f e / W y . ^ j f * * % * ; - ^ ? rf^ ^ 
What street or highwayJNBTB V™J ™*>^} '/)*? -//v , / / ^ M/e/ /vf'j^j ^f-
Direction of travel? fwf- -1-" rf*-^ J**j> dU&u- ~#- th? ho/tfj^axfL, sojf 6/ a)&U. 
Where did you start from?*rihXbM^r for/bit adhfo'tr Xr. ~T <*/*»/•&' AAO<J> , 
When? .? *A.uhs bUrt. t/au. ,r£^fe/vVrTat time is it now? fi£9d ( Lx^csJ a/- /lAxJ' 1 
What is today's data? //•/4/5<) r - D / % 9 f WBftk? " 7 ^- r • — 
(Actual time O&tl Date / / - / r / / n a y Tt/eS. } 
What city or county are you in now? i/T , 
What wece you doing during the last three hoprs? '3- /fi*<~J a//)ue(s f f^af d- jfs-/k.fo 
Have you been drinking? ^ / f /L^^/ ' Cd/frJ'. J/zsJ C£hres*J//> f 77/)g^f^a4:. 
What? How much? / ' • 
Where? ft fttt*U - , , ^ jA/fyf ,:^' 
When did you have your first drink? / W , 2. ^^-r *4*X- Last cjfink? %3& MALU^ p> r?-, umc 
Are,you under the ii>fluence of an alcpholic beverage /drugs) now? &*
 T j£(St- haf ^ sa£/k/s, 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines of/Irugs of any kind? 7/ky/y^asrf^, wr. /^6^/^^A^S &*£ 
(What kind? Get sample) CWsrer^nc.y 7riem»/± ¥ tfi/,*»J_ 7 ' 
When did you have the last rinsa?, < *foufA'Uiz*rtf6u i ^ W AC. /SJS&L/ 4/e«_J*<'k/ 
Are you ill? fa - J j ^ ^ r adA*rf /tJPrjfr*^. ". Ws/J i^r^. 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) ^ /W^W^^ J& /i^ S^j /a/'k*- *>4~ 
Were you involved in an accident today? ^^° ***. 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? When? 
How much? 
defendant due process of law. 
Accordingly the defendants motion to suppress is granted. 
Dated: 
XII. OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: 
XIII. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. B^opy of citation/temporary license 
2. • Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
a D Traffic accident report 
4. • Other documents (specify) 
I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that theJnformation contained above rn this report form and attached 
documents is true and correct to-my knowledge and belief and tharthis report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
duties. It rs my belief the subject was in violatton of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report. 
ofS*eace Oflfcer A Signature freac  fi A # 
Law Enforcement Agency: A ^ A . 4 . 
Date- Time: C/rrb ksA. 
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division 
4501 South 2700-West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841304)560 
